YOUTUBE OR YOULOSE? CAN YOUTUBE SURVIVE A COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUIT
Jason Breen
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A. Introduction
“As more people capture special moments on video, YouTube is empowering them to
become the broadcasters of tomorrow.”1 This self-glorying quote may have seemed far fetched
less than a year ago, but of late, YouTube has been discussed as a potential “sixth network,”2
rivaling traditional distributors of video content that have had a stranglehold over audiences for
decades. In some instances, it has even been shown that YouTube has already eclipsed television
as the preferred arena for audiences. Connie Chung’s “Thanks for the Memories” episode was
seen by twice as many viewers on YouTube after its initial broadcast.3 This is potentially a
frightening scenario for both content creators and traditional content distributors, as their markets
for both selling and providing exclusive avenues for consumption may be deteriorating.
It is fairly predictable that YouTube has already been the center of much attention for
possible lawsuits. These discussions intensified after Google’s acquisition of the company for
stock valued at $1.65 billion in October of 2006.4 This resolved one of the major issues that
confronted content providers: was a company like YouTube worth suing? Without the deep
pockets provided by a company like Google, copyright holders would not have had the proper
incentives to either sue the users of YouTube or the hosting service. Damages would have been
limited and possible injunctions against individual users posting clips would be costly with little
benefit. This is primarily due to the nature of a posting service like YouTube, which was aptly
* UCLA School of Law, Los Angeles, CA. J.D. expected May, 2007.
1
About YouTube, at http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
2
See Gary Arlen, ‘GooTube’ Impact on TV Unclear, TV Technology News (Nov. 1, 2006), at
http://www.tvtechnology.com/pages/s.0082/t.451.html.
3
YouTube Popularity Eclipses, and Influences, Fall TV Season, FoxNews.com (Aug. 18, 2006), at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,209022,00.html.
4
Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jeremy W. Peters, Google to Acquire YouTube for $1.65 Billion, The New York Times
(Oct. 9, 2006).
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described in the first lawsuit against YouTube: “‘The scope of the infringements is akin to a
murky moving target ... Videos uploaded are not identified by copyright owner or registration
number but rather by the uploader's idiosyncratic choice of descriptive terms to describe the
content of the video -- tags -- making it extremely impractical to identify plaintiff's copyrighted
works.’"5
The final difficulty for those wishing to sue a video web hosting service like YouTube is
its strict adherence to both prevailing case law and a statutory safe harbor that was not available
to the likes of Grokster, Napster and Aimster. Although it is arguable that YouTube was built on
the coat-tails of posted videos protected by copyright that would be deemed infringing, users also
posted a significant amount of content that would be considered legitimate. In its infancy,
legitimate content was predominately comprised of “user-created content.” This concept of
legitimacy has been expanded as many content providers see service providers like YouTube as
an avenue for growth. In August of 2006, YouTube unveiled a new advertising concept that will
allow content providers to utilize YouTube as both an advertising platform and a revenue stream.
A portion of the advertising sponsorships associated with pages featuring copyrighted content
will be shared with the copyright holder of the video, in addition to YouTube setting up “brand
channels” sponsored by the company. Some of the many companies forging deals with YouTube
include CBS, NBC, TVT, Epic Records, Atlantic Records, E! Entertainment, MTV2, and Fox
Searchlight.6 Music companies, like Sony BMG Entertainment, have even agreed to allow users
to include copyrighted songs in their user created uploads.7

5

Mack Reed, Publishers vs. YouTube: Does either side win?, USC Annenberg Online Journalism Review (posted
7/20/06) (quoting complaint of Robert Tur v. YouTube, case number CV 06-4436-GAF (FMOx), filed July 14, 2006
in United States District Court, Central District of California)
6
Fred von Lohmann, You Tube’s Balancing Act: Making Money, Not Enemies, The Hollywood Reporter, Esq. (July
10, 2006), available at
http://www.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=YouTube%27s+Balancing+Act%3A+Making+Money
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These arrangements can be very lucrative for content providers, as CBS has discovered
about one month after signing a deal with YouTube to create a brand channel. YouTube
estimated that CBS content has been viewed nearly 30 million times in the past month alone, but
this represents only a portion of the total benefit to CBS. Although the causation is questionable,
since posting clips of the shows on YouTube, the “Late Show with David Letterman” and “The
Late Late Show with Craig Ferguson” have seen increases in new broadcast viewership by 5%
and 7%, respectively.8 Statistics such as these also tend to legitimize YouTube, as three of the
top 25 most viewed videos for November were CBS clips that were uploaded legally.9
More importantly for video hosting services, an additional defense could insulate them
from the fate of a service like Grokster if they adhere to the safe harbor’s standards. The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) “‘was enacted to preserve copyright enforcement on the
Internet and to provide immunity to service providers from copyright infringement liability’ for
‘passive,’ ‘automatic’ actions in which a service provider’s system engages through a
technological process initiated by another without the knowledge of the service provider.”10 With
this policy goal in mind, four safe harbors were passed,11 one of which is applicable to
YouTube’s defense against a potential lawsuit. Section 512(c) provides insulation from liability
for monetary relief for those that store infringing content at the direction of a user.12 Whether
YouTube adheres to the substantive requirements, and the surrounding case law, will be the
%2C+Not+Enemies&expire=&urlID=18825489&fb=Y&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hollywoodreporteresq.com%2
Fthresq%2Fspotlight%2Farticle_display.jsp%3Fvnu_content_id%3D1002802746&partnerID=104851.
7
Song BMG Music Entertainment Signs Content License Agreement with YouTube (Oct. 9, 2006), at
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=2cwCau7cKsA.
8
After One Month, CBS Content Among Most Viewed Videos on YouTube, (Nov. 21, 2006), at
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=oJpEXVevcKg.
9
Id.
10
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2004), quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105796, at 72 (1998).
11
17 U.S.C.A. § 512. § 512 (a) – (d) provide for the four safe harbors, while § 512 (e) – (n) are applicable to each of
the safe harbors.
12
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1).
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focus of this paper. I opine that YouTube has established the necessary policies and business
practices to avail itself of this safe harbor.
Despite my opinion as such, YouTube and some content providers do not necessarily
believe that this affirmative defense is available to video web hosting services.13 Rather than rely
on §512(c) exclusively, YouTube deemed it necessary to obtain agreements with content
providers that eventually could have been plaintiffs in copyright infringement lawsuits, severely
limiting their exposure. At least five lawsuits have already been filed against video web hosting
services, one of which is against YouTube.14 There are many reasons beyond legal liability that
deals with content providers may have been explored, including the company’s desire to be
acquired by the likes of Google. At the very least, the strategic decision to share advertising
revenues and the upcoming court cases call to question whether these business models are
legitimate and warrant the investor attention they have received.
This paper will begin with a brief introduction to the service that YouTube provides, as
well as explanations for its amazing growth after its official launch in December of 2005.
Second, I will discuss the DMCA safe harbor found in §512(c) and how it has been interpreted
by the courts since its adoption in 1998. Within this section, I will focus on case law that is
applicable to YouTube’s potential liability, as well as how related case law (especially in the
realm of vicarious liability) may ultimately influence such a decision. Next, I will briefly discuss
13

For an interesting discussion of Mark Cuban’s heated opinion on YouTube’s viability over the long term, see
YouTube is “toast,” Biztech (Sept. 29, 2006), at http://www.smh.com.au/news/biztech/youtube-istoast/2006/09/30/1159337344017.html.
14
A complaint has been filed against YouTube. Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 2006 WL 3043777 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
YouTube’s answer has also been filed. Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 2006 WL 3043780 (C.D. Cal. 2006). Universal Music
has also sued three companies for infringement, including Myspace, Grouper Network and Bolt. UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. Mypsace, Inc., 2006 WL 3466446 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Universal hits MySpace with copyright suit,
CNNMoney.com (Nov. 17, 2006), at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/17/technology/universal_myspace.reut/index.htm?postversion; Sony: Grouper did
not break copyright law, CNNMoney.com (Nov. 22, 2006), at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/22/technology/sony_grouper.reut/index.htm. Finally, Veoh Networks is being sued
by the IO Group. Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 2006 WL 2180442 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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how YouTube may fair under the concepts of direct and secondary infringement liability,
obviating the necessity of the §512(c) safe harbor. Finally, I will discuss the policy implications
that such decisions could result in.

B. YouTube: How It Works and How It Grew
1. You Post, We Host
YouTube, started as a personal video sharing service, has become a worldwide
entertainment destination. One reason for its meteoric growth is the website’s ease of use. After
the user uploads and “tags”15 a video, the video hosting service encodes it, supplies a player, and
provides bandwidth and server space at no charge to the user. Once the video is posted, a URL is
provided which can be passed on to other users. These users can then browse the hosting service
for additional content. New users can also post their own content (as well as embed posted
videos onto other websites) and a library eventually is built on the hosting service. At this point,
the hosting service is merely “technology and infrastructure.”16
It has been argued that the reason for YouTube’s dominance over Google Video stemmed
from Google’s inability to move beyond the technological service, whereas YouTube became a
“destination and a brand.”17 This can be accomplished by the browsing experience and an
engaging and inviting front page.18 When the brand becomes associated with the content, the
aggregator becomes as important as the content and an audience is built, which can also lead to

15

User provides “tags” that become associated with the uploaded video. They can describe the genre of the video,
the person appearing in the video, or any other term that would easily identify the video. These terms are not
standardized, as they are left to the idiosyncrasies of the user. Therefore, a duplicate video may have different tag
associations. Tags are useful when users are browsing the site or when searching for videos.
16
How YouTube Works, On Demand Media, at ondemandmedia.typepad.com/odm/2006/10/how_youtubs.wor.html
(last visited 10/30/06)
17
Id.
18
Id.
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social networking opportunities for users.19 From there, network effects take over: more users
lead to more content, which then leads to more users.20 This self-perpetuating loop leads to
supremacy and the potential for monopoly-type power. The download, user and library statistics
have already begun to show YouTube’s dominance over its more than 100 competitors in the
free, Web-based video hosting service Internet business.21 Sources vary in their reporting of use
statistics, but Nielsen NetRatings has estimated that as of July, 2006, YouTube users streamed 50
million videos per day to more 12.5 million people each month.22
YouTube’s content is as varied as its users, which is reflected by the breadth of video that
can be found. There are some limits on what content is acceptable for posting. Unlawful,
obscene, pornographic or racist content is impermissible, as well as material that is copyrighted,
protected by trade secrets or otherwise subject to third-party proprietary rights without
permission of the rightful owner.23 In addition, YouTube has implemented a time restriction of
10-minute per video. One commentator stated “YouTube’s 10-minute clip limit and tiny video
19

Id.
From May to July, the number of videos uploaded daily on YouTube increased from 50,000 to 65,000. YouTube Serving 100 Million Videos a Day, Myspace Gaining Ground (July 16, 2006), at
http://blog.experiencecurve.com/archives/youtube-serving-100-million-videos-a-day.
21
von Lohmann, supra note 6.
22
Id. YouTube currently claims more than 70 million videos watched daily. About YouTube, supra note 1.
According to other reports, this could be up to 100 million videos daily. YouTube - Serving 100 Million Videos a
Day, Myspace Gaining Ground, supra note 20. From December, 2005 to October, 2006, YouTube has estimated the
number of unique users has grown from 3 to 6 million. Jonathan A. Hyman, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and
Love YouTube, at http://www.kmob.com/pdf/videohosting_youtube.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). In July of 2006,
according to Hitwise, it was estimated that YouTube held 29% of the U.S. multimedia entertainment market.
Myspace was the only company close to YouTube (19%), while Yahoo, MSN, Google and AOL (3-5% each) trailed
behind. Id. Again, according to Hitwise, YouTube was estimated to have a 43% market share of video search sites in
May of 2006, which MySpace Video (24%), Yahoo! Video Search (10%), MSN Video Search (9%), and Google
Video Search (6%) could not match. Hitwise, Hitwise Data Shows Overall Visits to Video Search Sites Up 164%,
Hitwise (May 24, 2006), at http://www.hitwise.com/press-center/hitwiseHS2004/videosearch.php.
23
The exact limitations, as found in YouTube’s Terms of Use, User Submissions: users will not “(i) submit material
that is copyrighted, protected by trade secret or otherwise subject to third party proprietary rights, including privacy
and publicity rights, unless you are the owner of such rights or have permission from their rightful owner to post the
material and to grant YouTube all of the license rights granted herein; (ii) publish falsehoods or misrepresentations
that could damage YouTube or any third party; (iii) submit material that is unlawful, obscene, defamatory, libelous,
threatening, pornographic, harassing, hateful, racially or ethnically offensive, or encourages conduct that would be
considered a criminal offense, give rise to civil liability, violate any law, or is otherwise inappropriate; (iv) post
advertisements or solicitations of business: (v) impersonate another person.” Terms of Service, at
http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
20

2007

YOUTUBE OR YOULOSE?

7

window cater to clip culture, not pirates,” as neither television programming nor movies would
fall under this limitation.24 This distinguishes YouTube from services that swap entire television
shows and movies.
What can be found on YouTube includes more traditional media content, like TV clips
and music videos. However, the website also hosts a large amount of user-created content,
including animations, amateur lip-synched songs, Hollywood trailer mash-ups and other remixed
material, family videos and seemingly anything that can be recorded using a camcorder.
Importantly, what ends up on YouTube is user dependant, as YouTube uploads videos from
users without screening prior to posting.25 The homepage includes ten daily “featured videos,”26
as well as one sponsored video.
2. Terms of Use and Copyright Info27
The User Submissions section of the “Terms of Use” implicates the copyright issues
discussed later in this paper, so a brief description of the pertinent clauses will inform that
examination. A user is solely responsible for any User Submission posted and affirms that they
own or have the necessary rights to use and authorize YouTube to use content that may be
protected by any proprietary rights. All ownership remains with the user submitting the video,
but the user grants YouTube a “non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and transferable
license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform User
Submissions in connection with the YouTube Website and YouTube’s business.”28 Additionally,

24

von Lohmann, supra note 6.
Hyman, supra note 22.
26
The selection process is not described by YouTube, nor is the information behind the selection process available
as far as I can tell. When asked to describe their metric, I received an e-mail response, unhelpfully stating “Thank
you for your interest in YouTube, but unfortunately we are unable to help you with the information you need. The
YouTube Team” (e-mail response, received Dec. 12, 2006, from copyright@youtube.com).
27
Copies of the Terms of Use and Copyright Info can be found at http://www.youtube.com/t/terms and
http://www.youtube.com/t/dmca_policy, respectively.
28
Section 5(B), Terms of Service, supra note 23.
25
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YouTube will remove any content that infringes copyright or does not comply with the terms,
after proper notification29 of infringement is provided or at their discretion, without prior notice
to the user and at their sole discretion.30 If a User Submission is removed from YouTube, the
user can elect to send a counter notice.31 Finally, the company details their repeat infringer
policy: “YouTube will also terminate a User's access to its Website, if they are determined to be
a repeat infringer. A repeat infringer is a User who has been notified of infringing activity more
than twice and/or has had a User Submission removed from the Website more than twice.”32
3. The Development of the YouTube Business Model
Statistics in April, 2006 estimated that YouTube’s bandwidth costs alone were upwards
of $1 million per month.33 Since YouTube is a free service to both its users and uploaders, this is
a hefty bill to sustain. Advertising dollars could help YouTube become profitable, if the
company is not already.34 This business model is similar to that exploited by broadcast television
networks: content is “free,” but the consumer “pays” by having to watch advertising. Reports
indicate that as late as July, YouTube was conservative in its advertising sales, adding ads

29

Section 5(D), Terms of Service provides elements of proper notification (can also be found in Copyright Info,
supra note 27). The elements needed for proper notification follow the requirements provided in 17 U.S.C.A.
512(c)(3) and provides a designated Copyright Agent. Content holders have used this policy to remove their
copyrighted materials from YouTube. For example, NBC owned “Saturday Night Live” skits and an American
Airlines in-house training video have both been removed after a proper notification was received by YouTube.
Hyman, supra note 22.
30
“YouTube does not permit copyright infringing activities and infringement of intellectual property rights on its
Website, and YouTube will remove all Content and User Submissions if properly notified that such Content or User
Submission infringes on another's intellectual property rights. YouTube reserves the right to remove Content and
User Submissions without prior notice…YouTube also reserves the right to decide whether Content or a User
Submission is appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for violations other than copyright infringement
and violations of intellectual property law, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or defamatory material,
or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User Submissions and/or terminate a User's access for uploading
such material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior notice and at its sole discretion.”
Section 5(C), Terms of Service, supra note 23.
31
Copyright Info, supra note 27.
32
Section 5(C), Terms of Service, supra note 23.
33
Dan Frommer, Your Tube, Whose Dime?, Forbes.com (Apr. 8, 2006), at
http://www.forbes.com/intelligentinfrastructure/2006/04/27/video-youtube-myspace_cx_df_0428video.html.
34
For an interesting discussion on YouTube’s profitability, see Mitch Ratcliffe, YouTube wildly profitable? (Oct. 4,
2006), at http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ratcliffe/?p=186.
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exclusively to search result pages.35 Following the Google acquisition, this approach has been
amended. Banner advertising is now included on most clip pages, as are video advertisements on
the homepage.36
The change in advertising strategy may have also been the result of the deals YouTube
has negotiated with many of the largest content providers, from sports leagues like the NHL,37 to
music companies like Song BMG and Universal Music,38 to network television stations like
CBS,39 to production companies like Lucasfilm.40 For example, YouTube’s deal with Warner
Music signed in September, 2006 allows Warner Music to use YouTube as a platform for
distributing music videos, while sharing in the ad revenue for the pages hosting Warner Music
content.41 In addition, brand channels have been created pursuant to these deals under the
“Channels–Partners” link.42
In September of 2006, YouTube also announced a plan to create technology to combat
the appearance of unlicensed content on its service. The above mentioned music deals embrace
this technology, which is designed “to automatically spot copyrighted material that users upload
without the permission of media companies, and then…share ad revenue with those
companies.”43 This technology apparently will be able to flag content like music videos, as well

35

von Lohmann, supra note 6.
Kevin J. Delaney & Ethan Smith, YouTube Model is Compromise Over Copyrights, Wall Street Journal (Sept. 19,
2006), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB11586212860036683675c3bUMscxrCANO6O7hKTgLNTTc_20070919.html.
37
See YouTube and National Hockey League Team Up For Strategic Content and Advertising Partnership (Nov. 15.
2006), at http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=2oJxBs3sq3k.
38
See Sony BMG Music Entertainment Signs Content License Agreement with YouTube (Oct. 9, 2006), at
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=2cwCau7cKsA and Universal Music Group and YouTube Forge
Strategic Partnership (Oct. 9, 2006), at http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=JrYdNx45e-0.
39
See CBS and YouTube Strike Strategic Content and Advertising Partnership (Oct. 9, 2006), at
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=iXG7e1g-BWI.
40
Hyman, supra note 22.
41
Delaney, supra note 36.
42
For an example, see http://www.youtube.com/members?s=pa&t=w&g=-1.
43
Delaney, supra note 36.
36
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as user created videos making use of copyrighted songs.44 The audio identification system is
hoped to be used to locate unauthorized non-music content as well. Such technology would help
lower copyright holders’ responsibility of tracking down unlicensed content on YouTube.

C. Is YouTube Safe Under §512(c)?
So what does this all mean for YouTube, or one of its competitors? As unlicensed,
copyrighted material appears on the website, YouTube is open to lawsuits for copyright
infringement. Content providers like Universal Music seem to believe, absent a licensing deal, a
video hosting service on the Internet would be liable for infringement, as the company has
proceeded with a lawsuit against Bolt and Grouper Network (which is now owned by Sony
Pictures Entertainment). Grouper defended its actions, stating that the service complies with the
DMCA.45 Whether a video hosting service would survive such a lawsuit will be discussed in this
section, utilizing YouTube as a case example.
The safe harbor does not affect the company’s liability under the different theories of
infringement, but limits the relief available. Finding safe haven under §512(c) would shield
YouTube from monetary liability or equitable relief, except as detailed in §512(j), for infringing
activities on its website.46 Based on the policy to prevent copyright infringement liability for
passive, automatic actions by a service provider and the surrounding case law, I believe

44

“The system relies partly on what’s known as ‘fingerprinting’ – comparing audio uploaded to the site to unique
attributes of copyrighted content it already knows.” Id. Video-identification technology is also hoped to be used
eventually. Id.
45
Sony: Grouper did not break copyright law, CNNMoney.com (Nov. 22, 2006), at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/22/technology/sony_grouper.reut/index.htm.
46
17 U.S.C.A § 512(c)(1). If an injunction is permissible under section 512, it is only for the limited context
described under § 512(j)(1). When deciding to grant injunctive relief, the court must consider, among other factors,
whether the injunction would “significantly burden either the provider or the operation of the provider’s system or
network” and whether “implementation of such an injunction would be technically feasible and effective, and would
not interfere with access to noninfringing material at other online locations.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(j)(A)&(C). Shutting
down YouTube completely would obviously violate these provisions.
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YouTube would fall under this non-exclusive affirmative defense. The cases discussed are
representative of the different approaches courts have applied to this DMCA provision. The
requirements that will be at the center of finding YouTube eligible are as follows: (1) does
YouTube have an appropriate repeat infringer policy and comply with standard technological
measures? (§512(i)); (2) is YouTube a service provider? (§512(k)(1)(B)); (3) does YouTube
have actual knowledge or is it aware of facts and circumstances of infringing activities on its
website? (§512(c)(1)(A)); (4) does YouTube receive a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity and the right and ability to control such activity? (§512(c)(1)(B)); and (5)
does YouTube have a sufficient notice and takedown system? (§512(c)(1)(C)).
1. Accommodation of Technology
“Nothing in [Section 512] shall be construed to condition the applicability of [subsection
(c)] on…a service provider monitoring its services or affirmatively seeking facts indicating
infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure complying
with the provisions of subsection (i).”47 This concept was further explained in the House Report,
where it states that a service provider need not “investigate possible infringements, monitor its
service, or make difficult judgments as to whether conduct is or is not infringing.”48 However,
there are certain affirmative requirements that the hosting service must adhere to as a condition
for eligibility.49
a. Repeat Infringer Policy
Section 512(i)(1)(A) creates three service provider requirements, as interpreted by the
Ellison50 court: “(1) adopt a policy that provides for the termination of service access for repeat

47

17 U.S.C.A. §512(m)(1).
H.R. Rep. 105-551(II) at 61 (1998).
49
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc, 213 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
50
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004), emphasis added.
48
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copyright infringers in appropriate circumstances; (2) implement that policy in a reasonable
manner; and (3) inform its subscribers of the policy.”51 Part (3) of the test is easily resolved for
YouTube, since a repeat infringer policy is included as a part of its Terms of Service.52 All that is
required is that users be put on notice that repeated infringements will lead to termination of
access from all services.53
The remainder of this test presents difficult, fact dependant questions, not easily decided
as a matter of law.54 The case law makes clear that the adopted policy must eliminate the
infringer and not merely the infringing content.55 As evidenced by the Corbis56 case, the level of
detail needed to adopt such a policy is not great. The Participation Agreement in this case was
held adequate despite its failure to define “repeat infringer,” arguably not indicating when
appropriate circumstances for termination existed. It was sufficient that users knew there was a
threat of losing access to the service if they infringed intellectual property rights, agreed to the
Participation Agreement, and were disciplined under the Participation Agreement for
violations.57
What are appropriate circumstances for termination is the subject of some debate. The
Cybernet58 court appears to take a stricter look into what “appropriate circumstances” and
“reasonably implemented” mean, whereas the Corbis, Ellison and CCBill59 courts appear to
conflate the issues into one. The Cybernet court implies that a “notice and take-down” provision
like that in Corbis, on its own, may not meet the reasonable implementation requirement when

51

Id. at 1080.
See Section B.2 above.
53
Corbis Corporation v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1102 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
54
Ellison, supra note 49, at 1078.
55
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp.2d 1077, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
56
Corbis, supra note 53.
57
Id. at 1101.
58
Cybernet, supra note 49.
59
CCBill, supra note 55.
52
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ignorance of infringement would result in the services becoming “safe havens or conduits for
known repeat copyright infringers.”60 Although they did not hold on this prong when rejecting
the summary judgment motion filed by the defendant, Cybernet, the court stated that there was a
strong likelihood Cybernet did not meet its obligation. A point that appeared important to the
court was that the known infringer be terminated from its services completely, not merely from
certain services.61
Under the lesser Corbis standard, it appears that YouTube would have met its
requirement. Their repeat infringer policy even provides for the appropriate circumstances for
which a user would be terminated. However, under the arguably stricter Cybernet standard,
YouTube may run afoul of being able to prevent repeat infringers from returning to the service.
As one commentator points out, the policy is fairly easy to circumvent due to the anonymity in
the posting process.62 It can be argued that YouTube could become a “safe haven” for infringers,
since users can create a new identity if their account is terminated. This fear, although legitimate,
may not create a major issue for YouTube if the court chooses to focus on YouTube’s efforts to
curb infringement on its website. The company has clearly taken steps to prevent infringement
through deals with content providers and their commitment to technologies to flag copyrighted
content. Therefore, it would be hard to argue that they were turning a blind eye to the problem or
creating a pirate-friendly website. This policy argument may not be persuasive, as YouTube’s
failure to eliminate infringers, rather than infringing material, is the purpose behind this
requirement.
b. Standard Technical Measures
60

Cybernet, supra note 49, at 1177-78. “These circumstances would appear to cover, at a minimum, instances where
a service provider is given sufficient evidence to create actual knowledge of blatant, repeat infringement by
particular users, particularly infringement of a willful and commercial nature.” Id. at 1177.
61
Id. at 1179.
62
Hyman, supra note 22.
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The second inquiry under §512(i)(1) requires the service provider “accommodates and
does not interfere with standard technical measures.”63 Standard technical measures is defined in
§512(i)(2).64 It would be difficult to argue that YouTube violates this requirement, as technical
measures do not exist at this time that allow copyright owners to identify and protect copyrighted
works in videos. YouTube could require watermarking by the copyright holder for videos to be
uploaded, but this would prevent user created content from appearing on the website. YouTube is
also taking affirmative steps, as discussed previously, to combat this problem. Until there is a
broad consensus of copyright owners who agree on such a standard, video hosting services are
likely accommodating standard technical measures.
2. Service Provider
The §512(c) safe harbor only applies to service providers, defined in §512(k)(1)(B) as “a
provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”65 Under the
standard definition, many websites may not be considered service provides,66 but under the
judicially interpreted, statutory definition, courts “have trouble imagining the existence of an
online service that would not fall under the definitions.”67
In Hendrickson68, this definition was interpreted very broadly, but the court failed to
qualify why eBay fell under the statute’s definition.69 The Corbis court provided more insight,
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17 U.S.C.A § 512(i)(1)(B).
“Definition.--As used in this subsection, the term "standard technical measures" means technical measures that are
used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works and --(A) have been developed pursuant to a
broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards
process; (B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose
substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or networks.” 17 U.S.C.A § 512(i)(2).
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17 U.S.C.A § 512(k)(1)(B)
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The plaintiffs in Aimster provide the commonplace definition: “internet service providers ‘generally provide a
way to connect to the Internet (e.g., phone or cable modem) as well as a mechanism that tells a computer how and
where to access information on the Internet.’” In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252F.Supp.2d 634, 658 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
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Id. Aimster was found to be a service provider.
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Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F.Supp.2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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Id. at 1088.
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holding that Amazon was a service provider, as it “operates web sites, provides retail and third
party selling services to Internet users, and maintains computers to govern access to its web
sites.”70 Further clarity into the breadth of the term “service provider” was offered by the
Cybernet court. In rejecting Perfect 10’s more limited definition, which would exclude services
that had an interest in the content or participated in screening or selecting the data,71 the court
made it abundantly clear that almost all websites would fall under this expansive definition,
including YouTube.
3. Knowledge: Actual or Apparent
The safe harbor is not intended to insulate those service providers who have actual or
apparent knowledge of infringing activity. The three prongs dealing with infringement awareness
have been interpreted very narrowly and favorably for service providers, which leads me to
conclude that YouTube will likely satisfy this requirement.
a. Actual Knowledge
There are two primary methods a content provider can us to establish a service provider’s
actual awareness under §512(c)(1)(A)(i). The first and more practical method is to supply
evidence that notification was provided of the infringing material. By substantially complying
with the DMCA’s notice requirement,72 actual infringement would be established.73 Failure by
the content holder to provide notice of infringement requires that there be knowledge beyond “a
general awareness that a particular type of item may be easily infringed.”74 Very little guidance
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Corbis, supra note 53, at 1100.
Cybernet, supra note 49, at 1175.
72
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(B). This requirement will be discussed in Section C.5 of this paper. The service provider
can challenge that that the notice substantially complied with the requirements.
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Corbis, supra note 53, at 1107.
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Id. at 1108.
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is provided by the courts as to the extent of the evidence needed,75 but an extreme onus can be
inferred by the high threshold required for apparent knowledge. As there is no affirmative duty to
search for infringing content, however, it appears that absent notification, establishing an
instance of actual knowledge of infringement would be almost impossible.
b. Apparent Knowledge
If actual knowledge is not established, the copyright holder has to demonstrate that the
service provider is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent.”76 Awareness does not hinge on whether a reasonable person would have inferred that
infringement was occurring,77 but whether a service provider “turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of
obvious infringement.”78 As interpreted by the Corbis court, to demonstrate apparent knowledge,
the copyright holder must show that their material was being hosted on a website that was
“clearly a pirate site.”79 One is clearly a pirate site if the URL and header information uses terms
that show the purpose is illegal, like pirate or bootleg, even when the viewing is “brief and
casual.”80
In Corbis, the court held that Corbis did not adequately establish that the defendant
Amazon had anything more than general knowledge of infringement, and did not ignore red flags
that would have led to awareness.81 Third party notices were not held to constitute red flags,
absent other evidence. Moreover, no evidence on the actual websites was found to be an
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Where no notice was provided of infringement of photos, actual knowledge was not established when the plaintiff,
Corbis, supplied evidence of third party notices regarding non-Corbis photos or evidence of awareness by the
defendant, Amazon, that Corbis licensed photos. Id. at 1107.
76
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
77
3 Nimmer on Copyright, §12B.04[A][1], at 12B-49.
78
H.R.Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 42.
79
Corbis, supra note 53, at 1108.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 1109. There was nothing blatant on the vendor listings that would have led to a suggestion that the websites
contained copyrighted material. Amazon meeting with representatives of Corbis to provide general knowledge that
infringing photos may appear on zShop sites was also not enough to prove that Amazon had apparent knowledge. Id.
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indicator of obvious infringement. Finally, they held that general familiarity of Corbis’ business
was not enough to put them on notice of infringement.82 Other courts looking at the issue of
apparent knowledge have held that defective notices do not act as red flags;83 nor were
disclaimers on a website stating that any copyrighted images found were either in the public
domain or posted for a newsworthy purpose.84
Whether YouTube ignores red flags is unclear, based on some cursory searches
performed in early December, 2006. Typing "pirate" into the search engine yields results ranging
from videos discussing the legal ramifications of pirating music, to videos that, oddly enough are
based on a pirate theme. “Illegal” generates information regarding illegal activities, or live
performances of Shakira performing her song, “Illegal” (ironic, I know). “Bootleg” is probably
the most damaging to YouTube, as the search results provide videos of soccer, concerts or
television interviews, all of which likely appear illegally. The service provider may not be
required to perform these searches, based on the lack of a duty to discover infringing material.
How a court would interpret what appears to be a conflict between the absence of an affirmative
obligation to investigate and the requirement that the service provider not ignore red flags is
unclear. However, the strictness of the courts’ interpretation of this prong leads me to believe
that YouTube would not have apparent knowledge.
c. Expeditious Removal
The final condition under §512(c)(1)(A) requires the service provider “upon obtaining
such knowledge or awareness” to act “expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material.”85 Accordingly, YouTube promptly removes the infringing material once it is properly
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Id. at 1108-9.
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notified. They also reserve the right to unilaterally remove material they are aware is infringing,
as expressed in the “Terms of Use.” Presumably, YouTube removes this material, and therefore
meets this requirement.
4. Financial Benefit, and Right and Ability to Control
This condition is likely to be the heart of a lawsuit against YouTube and their ability to
utilize the §512(c) safe harbor. Based on the prevailing precedent, YouTube may be found to
“directly benefit attributable to the infringing activity” and the “right and ability to control such
activity.”86 This is primarily the result of courts conflating precedent from contributory and
vicarious liability cases, which has led to inconsistent rulings. At least one court has explicitly
rejected the importation of contributory liability theories for the financial benefit prong.87 As this
issue would be integral to any ruling regarding YouTube, I will distinguish cases where other
theories of liability influence the decision of the court. Ultimately, I believe the court will follow
the CoStar II line of cases, rather than those that rely on Fonovisa88 and its progeny.
a. Direct Financial Benefit Attributable to the Infringing Activity
There are two primary precedents under this section of the safe harbor. The first, set by
CoStar II, was ruled consistent by Cybernet, which falls into the vicarious infringement line of
cases. CoStar II involves the posting of photographs by users to advertise property listings on the
defendant LoopNet’s website, some of which were potentially infringing. No posting fee was
required for any listing, regardless of the use of a photograph.89 The court held that there is no
direct financial benefit attributable to the infringing activity “where the infringer makes the same
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17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(B)
See CoStar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc. 164 F.Supp.2d 688, 705 (D.C. Maryland 2001) (“CoStar II”).
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Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (Ninth Cir. 1996).
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CoStar II, supra note 87, at 692
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kind of payment as non-infringing users of the provider’s service.”90 Neither the infringers or the
non-infringers paid anything for the service, so there was no direct financial benefit.91
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that there is a direct financial benefit
attributable to the infringing activity for the purposes of §512(c) when “infringing performances
enhance the attractiveness of the venue to potential customers.”92 The court found that the
application of this “indirect” benefit test, although applicable in a contributory infringement
cause of action, was not warranted by the plain language or purpose of the statute. Since the
financial benefit was required to be directly attributable, an indirect benefit test was deemed
inapplicable.93 However, this indirect benefit test was applied in Fonovisa as a method of
showing direct financial benefit from the customers in a vicarious infringement suit.94 This
seems to imply that CoStar II was rejecting the use of vicarious liability precedent for this
requirement of the safe harbor, as it was a vicarious liability test that was rejected. Whether this
was their intent is unclear,95 but a question arises as to what case law relating to direct financial
benefit should be applicable to the DMCA safe harbors.
The Cybernet court held that “the direct flow of income to Cybernet based on the number
of new Adult Check users that sign up to Adult Check from infringing sites establishes that direct
relationship.”96 In this case, websites using the Adult Check97 service included infringing
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Id. at 705, quoting H.R.Rep. No. 105-551, Part 2, at 54.
Id.
92
Fonovisa, supra note 88, at 263.
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CoStar II, supra note 87, at 705. The plaintiff attempted to use Playboy Ent. v. Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. 503
(N.D. Oh. 1997), a contributory infringement cause of action, as controlling precedent. The test discussed from
Hardenburgh relies on Fonovisa’s vicarious liability precedent. I believe Hardenburgh misapplied this precedent in
a contributory negligence context.
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Fonovisa, supra note 88, at 263.
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Interestingly, at the same time, the court states that “the DMCA provides no safe harbor for vicarious
infringement because it codifies both elements of vicarious liability.” Id. at 704. The Cybernet court expressed “no
opinion on the question whether ‘directly attributable’ language is narrower or equivalent to the general vicarious
infringement requirements.” Cybernet, supra note 49, at 1181.
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Id.
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pictures. The webmasters who run and promote the websites under the Adult Check brand are
not charged a fee for the service; rather the customer pays a monthly fee to Cybernet, who then
distributes revenue to the webmasters based on which website was responsible for the
enrollment.98 Perfect 10 found approximately 900 Adult Check affiliated websites99 housed more
than 10,000 copies of Perfect 10 images.100
The court looked at legislative history to derive the outcome. Courts should use a
“common-sense, fact based approach, not a formalistic one.”101 Where the value of the service
originates from the infringing content, rather than a “legitimate business,” the service provider
receives a direct financial benefit.102 Since membership growth, and thus Cybernet’s revenue,
was dependant on the quantity and quality of images available on Adult Check member websites
(some of which were using infringing images to attract new members), a direct benefit was found
to exist.103
In coming to this conclusion, the court attempts to distinguish this case from CoStar II:
“[t]his is quite different from the situation in CoStar where the site made money on other
services it offered, which were not directly tied to the infringing activity.”104 Implicit in this
argument is that the infringement is enhancing the desirability of these sites, which leads to a
disproportionate amount of funds from infringing sites. Otherwise, using the reasoning of CoStar
II, since the webmasters are indirectly paying the same percentage fee per new customer
regardless of their status as an infringer, they would not be directly benefiting from the
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Adult Check is an age verification service, which is designed to prevent minors from accessing online
pornographic content. Id. at 1157-58.
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Id.
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Adult Check has approximately 300,000 sites total. Id. at 1158.
100
Id. at 1162.
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H.R.Rep. 105-551(II), at 54.
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Id.
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infringement. The Cybernet court appears to be adopting a vicarious infringement standard for
direct financial interest, like that used in Fonovisa. Similarly, Aimster held that the direct
financial benefit element of §512(c)(1)(B) was met, and refers the reader to the section
discussing vicarious liability.105 In Aimster, the “financial benefit element is…satisfied
where…the existence of infringing activities act as a draw for potential customers.”106 The tests
adopted in Fonovisa, Aimster and Cybernet appear to be the same test, and it is unclear that any
of them are consistent with the precedent set in CoStar II. Whether all vicarious infringement
precedents for this prong are applicable is ambiguous to say the least.
One of particular importance to YouTube is the recently decided Google107 case, where
under a vicarious infringement theory of liability, the defendant Google was found to receive a
direct financial benefit. Applying the precedent of Fonovisa as applied broadly by the Napster108
court, a direct financial benefit was established as Google’s revenue was directly dependent on
an increase in their user-base. “Google certainly derives a direct financial benefit if users visit
AdSense109 partners’ websites that contain such infringing photos” since they will share in the
advertising revenue appearing on those sites.110
This murky background creates many questions as to YouTube’s ability to rely on
§512(c). “Some have argued that this may restrict the kinds of advertising business models that
YouTube (and other video hosing services) might want to pursue, as ads tied too closely to an
infringing video could be viewed as creating a ’financial benefit directly attributable to the
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Aimster, supra note 66, at 661.
Id. at 655.
107
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). For a more detailed description of this case’s
vicarious liability precedent, please see Section D.2.a above.
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Napster, Inc. v. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001).
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“‘To participate [in AdSense], a website publisher places code on its site that ask Google’s server to
algorithmically select relevant advertisements’ based on the content of that site.” Google, supra note 107, at 834,
quoting Def.’s MacGillivray Decl. ¶ 9.
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Google, supra note 107, at 857.
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infringing activity.’”111 This may explain YouTube’s initial hesitance to place advertisements on
content pages, as well as their rush to make deals with copyright holders. Following CoStar II’s
precedent, it is unlikely that YouTube will be found to have received a direct financial benefit
from displaying a banner ad on an infringing video’s website. As posters of video, including
infringers, are not charged to do so, they appear to follow that precedent. The less formalistic
approach of the Cybernet court may not find this to be persuasive. Moreover, if other vicarious
liability doctrines are imported to §512(c), like that of Google, it appears that YouTube’s banner
ads on infringing video pages would clearly confer a direct financial benefit.
b) Right and Ability to Control Activity
The case law is slightly more consistent for this section of the statutory safe harbor.
Almost all of the courts recognize that the right and ability to control the infringing activity, “as
the concept is used in the DMCA, cannot simply mean the ability of a service provider to remove
or block access to materials posted on its website or stored on its system.”112 Two cases
explicitly import concepts from contributory and vicarious infringement jurisprudence,113 again
generating doubt as to which precedents are applicable to this statutory condition.
The Hendrickson court argued that the purpose behind the DMCA necessitated the
adoption of the above bright line rule. The DMCA requires that infringing materials be removed
from the website, so to espouse that service providers would lose their insulation under §512(c)
by adhering to the statute would be internally inconsistent. Additionally, the court held that the
“voluntary practice of engaging in limited monitoring of [a service provider’s] website for
111

von Lohmann, supra note 6.
Hendrickson, supra note 68, at 1093.
113
Cybernet applies a concept borrowed from contributory infringement cases to hold that the company had a right
and ability to control the infringing activity. Cybernet, supra note 49, at 1181-82. CoStar II seems to indicate that
they are adopting a vicarious infringement standard: “LoopNet does not have the ‘right and ability’ to control its
users commensurate with the standard for vicarious infringement.” CoStar II, supra note 87, at 704. Aimster again
refers the reader to the section discussing vicarious liability in coming to its conclusion that this requirement is met.
Aimster, supra note 66, at 661.
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‘apparent’ infringements…cannot, in and of itself, lead the Court to conclude that [the service
provider] has the right and ability to control infringing activity within the meaning of the
DMCA.”114 eBay’s practice of searching its website daily, using terms like “bootleg” or
“pirated,” to find and remove users that are selling infringing products was consistent with
legislative history, stating that a service provider’s ability to use §512(c) should not be limited
solely because of their use of a monitoring program.115 This rule also makes the statute internally
consistent with what is required under the “red flag” standard for apparent knowledge.116
The Cybernet court held that Cybernet had the right and ability to control the infringing
activity. The court provides a list of activities Cybernet partook in that established this
conclusion, which included prescreening sites,117 giving “extensive advice,” prohibiting
“proliferation of identical sites,” among other things. These procedures meant they did
“something more,” a concept borrowed from contributory liability of trademark licensors.118 It
appears the court was concerned that Cybernet was too involved with the content, rather than
merely operating a service for hosting the content. The Corbis court, applying Cybernet, held
that Amazon did not have the right and ability to control: “Amazon does not preview the
products prior to listing, does not edit the product descriptions, does not suggest prices, or
otherwise involve itself in the sale.”119
Aimster refers the reader to the vicarious liability section in its application of the DMCA.
In doing so, the precedent set by this court is the one outlier where termination of individual
114

Hendrickson, supra note 68, at 1093. The court also stated that eBay did not have a right and ability to control the
infringing activity, since the sales and distribution of the infringing material was consummated offline, and no
infringing material was actually found on the website. eBay never had possession or the ability to inspect the
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users is found to be instructive in holding that a right and ability to control existed. In addition,
the Aimster service required members to logon, which allowed them to supervise the activities of
the users. Aimster’s argument that the system’s encryption prevented them from blocking a
user’s access without shutting down the entire service was rejected.120 The court again relied on
Fonovisa as controlling precedent, where an ability to control was found for vicarious
infringement when the company promoted, policed and controlled access of customers through
its rules and regulations.121
It is fairly clear that Aimster is inconsistent in the cases analyzing the §512(c) safe harbor.
A court could choose to follow the absolute importation of vicarious liability precedent, although
I doubt they will to such an extent as to make §512(c) internally inconsistent. Furthermore,
YouTube is unlikely to lose the benefits of the safe harbor for prescreening and removal of sites
obviously infringing copyright, consistent with their duty to not ignore red flags of infringement.
The harder question is whether YouTube is found to control the content found on its website, as
to amount to an issue like that in Cybernet. One commentator has expressed concern that
exerting editorial control, like creating a “top 10” list or “editor’s picks,” could create an issue
under this DMCA safe harbor.122 YouTube may have already run afoul, as they post “featured
videos” on the home page.123 They have also setup “channels” for certain content providers. If
YouTube provides advice to users who administer channels, a court could find that they had the
right and ability to control. Lastly, since their Terms of Service state that YouTube retains a
120

Aimster, supra note 66, at 654-55.
Fonovisa, supra note 88, at 263.
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Amanda Bronstad, Video Web Sites Download a Defense, The National Law Journal (Nov. 2, 2006), at
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license in the material, they could be said to have a certain level of control over the material,
including the ability to reproduce, distribute and prepare derivative works of the submitted video.
Whether having a license to control is synonymous with control is uncertain. These fact
dependant questions could be integral to a court’s determination.
5. Notification and Replacement of Disabled Material
The elements of a proper notification of claimed infringement are laid out in
§512(c)(3).124 YouTube’s Terms of Use strictly adheres to the statute. Following a proper
notification, the service provider must expeditiously remove or disable access to the infringing
material.125 “The purpose behind the notice requirement under the DMCA is to provide the
internet service provider with adequate information to find and examine the allegedly infringing
material expeditiously.”126 A notification must adhere “substantially” to the requirements. A
written communication provided to the designated agent is necessary, and not part of the
substantial adherence requirement.127 The two notification obligations that are most implicated
with regards to substantial compliance are those dealing with identification of the infringing
material.128 This question is extremely fact dependant and thus, will rely on the specifics of a
copyright holders notice.129
If the original poster chooses to file a substantially compliant counter-notification,
pursuant to §512(g)(3), the service provider must supply notice to the provider of the initial
124

The statute lists the requirements in 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi).
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). Some content holders do not believe that YouTube’s policies are satisfactory.
Disney stated that “[i]t’s not efficient and [they] think there is a larger conversation to be had.” Eric Auchard,
YouTube needs to do more on piracy, Disney exec says, Reuters (Nov. 29, 2006), available at
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CCBill, supra note 55, at 1087.
127
Hendrickson, supra note 68, at 1091. Strict adherence to these requirements is essential.
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“Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a
single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.” 17 U.S.C.A. §
512(c)(3)(A)(ii). “Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing
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notification that the removed material will be replaced.130 Unless the provider of the notification
informs the service provider of their filing an action to seek a court order to restrain the
material’s restoration, the service provider must replace the material.131 If the service provider
adheres to these requirements, they “shall not be liable to any person for any claim based on the
service provider’s good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to
be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,
regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing.”132
Unsubstantiated claims of infringement could lead to liability for the filer of the notice.133

D. Is YouTube An Infringer?
The safe harbor discussed above does not shield YouTube from being found guilty of
infringement, under the theories of direct, vicarious and contributory liability. The DMCA
statute is an affirmative defense that merely limits the relief available. If a court finds that
YouTube is not liable for any of the above forms of copyright infringement, then the safe harbor
under §512(c) is not necessary. YouTube is currently being sued by Robert Tur under each of
these theories of liability, as well as the Grokster134 theory of inducement.135 A sampling of
relevant precedents indicates that YouTube could be found liable of copyright infringement.
Thus, the question of whether §512(c) is satisfied is crucial to its ability to operate.
1. Direct Infringement
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17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(2)(A)-(B).
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To establish a prima facie claim for direct infringement, the copyright holder must
demonstrate that they own the material and that one of the exclusive rights provided under 17
U.S.C. §106 have been violated.136 YouTube’s users potentially violate all of these exclusive
rights of copyrighted material when running its web service, but it is clear that they could be
found to infringe the rights of reproduction and distribution, as Napster’s users were.137
YouTube’s liability for direct infringement is improbable, however, based on the precedent set
by CoStar.
The CoStar court held that “there should still be some element of volition or causation
which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to use a copy by a third party,”
although copyright is a strict liability statute.138 The court went on to state that “an ISP who owns
an electronic facility that responds automatically to users’ input is not a direct infringer.”139 They
are then acting more as conduits than copiers, as they have “no interest in the copy itself.”140 The
question then becomes whether YouTube is truly passive.
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Napster, supra note 108, at 1013. The rights granted under 17 U.S.C. § 106 include ability to reproduce, prepare
derivative works, distribute copies, perform publicly, display publicly and perform work publicly by means of a
digital transmission.
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Id. at 1014. YouTube’s users could be protected under the Fair Use defense provided under 17 U.S.C. § 107. The
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then YouTube would not be found liable of contributory or vicarious liability for posting such a video. At least one
commentator believes that YouTube’s users have a good fair use defense, as the end user is engaging in a noncommercial activity and most copyrighted material in user created videos do not have a licensing market. von
Lohmann, supra note 6.
138
CoStar Group Inc. v. LoppNet Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 548 (4th Cir. 2004).
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Id. at 550.
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The passivity of YouTube, at first glance, seems clear as YouTube does not pre-screen
videos before they are posted. A pre-screening process does not in itself equate to non-passivity,
as LoopNet’s process of briefly examining photographs that clearly infringed copyright did not
create liability for LoopNet as a direct infringer in CoStar.141 The current lawsuits challenge
whether services like YouTube are in fact passive, as “they are greatly involved in editing their
content.”142 The creation of the featured video section, for example, could be considered
“copying,” similar to that found in Hardenburgh.143 After encouraging users to upload files onto
their system, Hardenburgh’s employees would transfer the files into folders available to
subscribers. This was considered distribution by the court.144 YouTube could befall a similar fate
if its employees are involved in the selection process of featured videos. This would be a factual
question and at least calls to question whether YouTube would be deemed a direct infringer.145
2. Vicarious Infringement
As discussed in Section C.4, YouTube is most in danger of being found liable for
vicarious infringement of copyright. The vicariously liability conditions for users’ infringement
are very similar (if not identical) to those §512(c)(1)(B). The party claiming infringement must
establish that the service provider “derived a direct financial benefit and had the right and ability
to supervise the infringing activity.”146
a. Direct Financial Benefit
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The Ellison court further narrowed the Fonovisa precedent for the direct financial benefit
prong as applied to the digital world in Napster. “The essential aspect of the ‘direct financial
benefit’ inquiry is whether there is a causal relationship between the infringing activity and any
financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless of how substantial the benefit is in proportion to a
defendant’s overall profits.”147 In this case, AOL was not found liable for hosting USENET
groups where users transferred an author’s copyrighted novels. Insufficient evidence was
presented that AOL’s “customers either subscribed because of the available infringing material
or canceled subscriptions because it was no longer available.”148 The USENET groups were not
found to be a draw that increased AOL’s userbase, but rather were an added benefit of the
service.149
The Cybernet court found that there was a strong likelihood of success that there was a
direct financial benefit. Unlike Ellison, the content of the websites found in Cybernet’s network
was the primary attraction for customers. “The more consumers appreciate the content of a page,
the more money Cybernet receives,” as the user will only signup through their AdultCheck
system if they are pleased by the pictures appearing on the member website.150 Unlike the Ellison
court, where the copyright holder presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that the
USENET groups acted as a draw, the Cybernet court placed this burden on the defendant:
“Cybernet has given no reason to believe that these pages do not attract consumers, thereby
creating a financial benefit to Cybernet.”151
Most recently, and potentially most damaging to YouTube, the Google court found that a
website that posts advertisements on websites exhibiting infringing images were directly
147
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benefited under the theory of vicarious infringement. Google received a percentage of the
advertising revenue derived from users of the infringing websites. Moreover, the infringing
photographs found on the internet acted as at least a limited draw for Google Image Search, and
the court found it “indisputable that Google does stand to benefit the more users visit and use
Google Image Search.”152 In neither of these theories of direct financial benefit was firm
evidence provided,153 demonstrating the broadness by which the court has interpreted this prong.
The progression and apparent liberalization of this prong established by these illustrative
cases signifies the likelihood that YouTube will be found to receive a direct financial benefit
from the infringing videos on its website. The infringing videos hosted on YouTube
hypothetically act as a draw for customers, even if no definitive evidence is presented by a
potential plaintiff that provides confirmation. Under the stricter Ellison standard, evidence could
be provided that establishes that copyrighted videos have been among the most popular with
users. However, as more content becomes licensed, the amount of illegal material found on
YouTube continues to diminish, as does the drawing power of the remaining, improperly
uploaded videos. Similar to Google, YouTube also relies on its ability to sell advertising space to
collect revenue. If a banner advertisement is found alongside an infringing video, the necessary
nexus of benefit would appear to be demonstrated.
b. Right and Ability to Supervise
Fonovisa provides the controlling precedent for this prong of the vicarious liability test.
A third party has a right and ability to supervise the infringing activity when their rules and
regulations provide for the power to promote and police the service, as well as control the access

152
153

Google, supra note 107, at 857.
Id.

2007

YOUTUBE OR YOULOSE?

31

of customers.154 Napster applied this precedent to the digital realm and determined that Napster
retained the right to control access to its system. The terms of service provided that Napster
reserved the right to refuse access and terminate users at its discretion. “To escape imposition of
vicarious liability, the reserved right to police must be exercised to its fullest extent,” which
included monitoring the file name indices155 for copyrighted material.156 The court held that
Napster failed to police its system, and thus held to satisfy this condition. YouTube’s liability
will likely depend on this “closed system” standard.157 YouTube’s internal policy of searching
tags would appear integral to a court holding, as their terms of service provide for controls
similar to those endorsed by Napster.158
3. Contributory Infringement
“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory
infringer.’”159 There is no contributory infringement for providing the means to infringe where
the means to infringe is a staple article of commerce that is capable of substantial non-infringing
use.160 This requires that a balance be struck between providing effective copyright protection
154
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and preserving the “rights of others to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”161
YouTube’s function as a distribution channel for user-created and licensed works, otherwise
lacking avenues for dissemination, will likely lead a court to rule that YouTube is not liable for
contributory infringement under the staple of commerce doctrine.
a. Knowledge
There is some disagreement in the courts as to the scope of the knowledge requirement.
Generally, “contributory liability requires that the secondary infringer ‘know or have reason to
know of direct infringement.’”162 The Napster court limited this precedent to actual knowledge
in the online context. “Absent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a
computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.”163 Napster was found to
possess the specific information which identified the infringing activity, including a notification
by the RIAA of more than 12,000 infringing files and a document written by the service’s
founder about the need to remain “ignorant of users’ real names and IP addresses.”164 While the
users were eliminated from the servers, the songs were still available for download.165 In
contrast, the Netcom166 court found that a disputed issue of fact as to knowledge existed where an
online bulletin board was merely capable of infringing uses.167

161

Id.
Napster, supra note 108, at 1020, quoting Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc. 902 F.2d
829, 845 & 846 n. 29 (11th Cir. 1990).
163
Id. at 1022.
164
Id. at 1020 n. 5. The Cybernet court found that notification of generic potential copyright infringement by users
should have alerted the defendant to infringing activities occurring on its member websites. Cybernet, supra note 49,
at 1169.
165
Napster, supra note 108, at 1022 n. 6.
166
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc. 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
167
Napster, supra note 107, at 1021.
162

2007

YOUTUBE OR YOULOSE?

33

The Aimster II court rejected the 9th Circuit’s test, and provided that constructive
knowledge is sufficient in cases where the secondary infringer exhibits willful blindness.168 The
operator of a service cannot use “encryption software to prevent himself from learning what
surely he strongly suspects to be the case: that the users of his service--maybe all the users of his
service--are copyright infringers.”169 The court also held that it was insufficient for the service to
only be physically capable of non-infringing uses. Absent evidence of actual non-infringing uses
by the users of the service, a service can be found contributorily liable for infringement.170 “Even
when there are noninfringing uses of an Internet file-sharing service, moreover, if the infringing
uses are substantial, then to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the service
must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least
reduce substantially the infringing uses.”171
Under either of these standards, YouTube may be found to have knowledge of infringing
uses. Content users have made multiple requests for videos to be removed from the service,172
akin to the notice that the Napster court found sufficient to find Napster had actual knowledge.
Additional evidence of knowledge could be established through the discovery process. Unlike
Napster, YouTube appears to eradicate the files completely from their system, although it may be
impossible to have a full-proof system of total abolition. YouTube may have difficulties claiming
that they are merely aware of the possibility of infringement, but it is hard to imagine a court
ruling that YouTube has been willfully blind to the issue of copyright infringement. As
previously discussed, they are attempting to license content that would otherwise appear
168
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illegally, as well as researching copyright identification technology. Finally, YouTube has many
well established, non-infringing uses as have been discussed throughout this paper. The
unavailability of other means of distribution would endanger these non-infringing purposes from
occurring, especially in the context of user-created content. The combination of these factors will
likely lead a court to rule that YouTube is not contributing to its users’ infringements.
b. Material Contribution
“Providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity is sufficient to establish
contributory liability.”173 To create a triable issue of fact for material contribution, it is only
necessary that the service allow users to access copyrighted works.174 Napster was found to
materially contribute to infringement by providing the site and facilities for direct infringement
that enabled users to easily find and download music that would otherwise be difficult absent the
service.175 This “but for” causation is likely to be damaging to YouTube, as they provide the
servers and website that store and display videos posted by users. Absent YouTube (or similar
services), users would not be able to share videos with the ease for which they are now
accustomed. Therefore, a content holder will almost undeniably be able to present a prima facie
case for material contribution.
4. Grokster Inducement
The Grokster theory of inducement is an additional theory of secondary liability. “[O]ne
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting
acts of infringement by third parties.”176 As a secondary infringer meeting this test would not
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“compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise,” the Sony
substantial non-infringing use standard is not applicable in such cases.177 The court found three
notable factors that proved Grokster had the unlawful intent to promote infringement: (1) the
service was aimed to satisfy a known demand for infringement; (2) the service did not develop
tools to lessen infringement on the service; and (3) the commercial viability of the service hinges
on high volume use, which is infringing.178 The court states that in the absence of corroborating
evidence, factors (2) or (3) would not alone establish a finding of unlawful intent.179
Robert Tur’s lawsuit addresses each of these factors specifically. He first claims that
YouTube “aimed to satisfy in part a known source of demand for copyright infringement, e.g.,
the market comprised of former Grokster video ‘sharers.’”180 Whether YouTube has internal
documents suggesting an unlawful intent will be critical, but publicity for the service never
claimed to be a replacement for a file sharing service previously shut-down.181 Next, Tur claims
that YouTube “failed to develop any substantial filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish
the infringing activity.”182 It is at least arguable that YouTube has created mechanisms to
diminish infringing activity, by signing deals with content providers and creating a
notice/takedown system that would remove copyrighted material from its website. YouTube is
also creating software to help curb infringement. Finally, Tur claims that YouTube is pursuing a
“model which rewards high-volume use, including that of infringing uses, with greater
177
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advertising revenue, as revenue is correlated with usage.”183 This factual question of infringing
uses would require discovery. However, as it is probable that Tur will fail to verify YouTube’s
intent to satisfy a known demand for illegally sharing copyrighted videos, I am skeptical that
YouTube will be found liable for inducement.

E. Conclusion
The outcomes of the legal and factual disputes discussed above will be integral to the
future development of a service like YouTube. Video web hosting services have already proven
to be exceptionally popular, and the potential for growth seems immense. If the courts find
YouTube guilty of copyright infringement, either directly or under a theory of secondary
liability, the availability of the DMCA safe harbor will be integral in allowing the service to
develop on their current trajectory. Otherwise, an alteration of policies may be necessary to
conform to the court’s interpretation of the statute’s qualifications. The implications of such
potential changes, and whether they will allow YouTube to flourish and become a significant
media channel, are yet to be seen. Remember, YouTube is still a fledgling company that has
been in operation for roughly a year. Google obviously believes the future for video web hosting
servers is bright, but the ever evolving digital world, with its demanding and erratic customer
base, may not agree.
This is already apparent, as some users have voiced concerns about how YouTube may
change after Google purchased the company. One YouTube poster commented that "[t]he Wild
West feel of YouTube is already slipping away, and within a few weeks it likely will be gone
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altogether.”184 The service’s popular creators may become annoyed by YouTube’s ability to
profit from their content without any retribution, while more powerful content aggregators are
sharing in advertising revenue. Their once loyal user base, which helped build the service, could
flock to another video hosting service perceived to be less restrictive of their use.185 Will
YouTube’s interest lie with these users or their new partners, the major movie studio, networks
and record labels? Ironically, the deals that added legitimacy to YouTube’s business model may
result in their losing the user base that made them the target of a $1.65 billion acquisition. The
legal consequences, therefore, go beyond the possibility of copyright infringement liability. They
may ultimately influence YouTube’s ability to become the “sixth network.”
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